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The Relevance of Federal Norms for
State Separation of Powers
Michael C. Dorf*
INTRODUCTION
Of the American Constitution's three most distinctive fea-
tures-federalism, judicial protection of individual rights and sep-
aration of powers'-only the last has been held inapplicable to the
states. First, federalism is, by its terms, a doctrine of power-shar-
ing between the national and state governments. The distribution
of authority between nation and states was the chief point of con-
tention during the period of the Constitution's framing and ratifi-
cation, and in recent years, the United States Supreme Court has
vigorously enforced federalism norms. 2 Second, although the origi-
nal Constitution contained relatively few individual rights provi-
sions applicable to the states,3 during the last half-century, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments as providing exten-
sive protection for individual rights against state interference. Yet
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. I am grateful to John Manning for
insightful comments and suggestions and to Daniel Spilo for research assistance.
1. Throughout this article I use the term "separation of powers" somewhat
imprecisely to refer to the general principle of division of government authority
into three branches, including the principle of "checks and balances." These con-
cepts are sometimes seen as opposing because the branches can only check one
another if their work overlaps to some degree. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
121 (1976); Wallace Mendelson, Separation of Powers, in The Oxford Companion to
the Supreme Court of the United States 774 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992);
Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 Duke L.J. 561, 645-46.
For my purposes here, it will not be necessary to distinguish between separation of
powers and checks and balances, and thus for simplicity I subsume the latter cate-
gory within the former.
2. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249-50 (1833).
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separation of powers remains aloof. Despite the Supreme Court's
willingness to impose sometimes rigid formal rules on the
branches of the federal government,4 the Court has not found justi-
ciable limits on the states' choice of governmental structures.
This article uses Rhode Island's current controversy surround-
ing legislative appointments to executive commissions as a vehicle
for (re-)examining the role of the federal Constitution in state sep-
aration-of-powers disputes. Part I examines the United States
Supreme Court's frequent claim that the separation-of-powers
principle does not apply to the states. It shows that several provi-
sions of the federal Constitution assume a significant difference be-
tween the branches of state government, and concludes that some
measure of separation of powers in state government is therefore a
structural requirement of the federal Constitution.
Part 11 addresses the question whether the Guaranty Clause
of the federal Constitution 5-arguably the best textual source for a
general separation-of-powers requirement that applies to the
states-is justiciable in state court. Notwithstanding a recent and
otherwise thoughtful opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court con-
cluding that the Clause is not justiciable under existing precedent,
Part II argues that the issue is open, and finds that there are
sound arguments on each side.
Yet even if the Constitution contains some justiciable separa-
tion-of-powers requirement applicable to the states, that require-
ment is likely satisfied by a wide range of arrangements. Part III
suggests a method for determining what specific state practices are
permitted under the federal Constitution. The method is drawn by
comparing and contrasting separation-of-powers norms with the
provisions of the Bill of Rights that the United States Supreme
Court has held are "incorporated" against the states via the Four-
teenth Amendment. Part III concludes that legislative appoint-
ments to executive commissions satisfy the proper test.
Part IV briefly addresses the question of how the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and other state high courts should go about inter-
preting the separation-of-powers provisions of their respective
state constitutions. It draws some lessons from the federal com-
4. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998); Metropolitan
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252
(1991); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
5. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
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parison and then suggests that at least under some circumstances,
legislative appointments to executive commissions could be under-
stood as an attempt to restore the balance upset by the emergence
of administrative agencies. These agencies combine functions in a
way that itself seems inconsistent with separation of powers.
Although such a functional justification would be inadequate to
override a clear textual command such as the Incompatibility
Clause of the federal Constitution,6 it might be sufficient to satisfy
the more general language of the Rhode Island Constitution.
Under a functional approach, the question would not turn on a con-
ceptual analysis of the terms "executive" and "legislative," but on
the efficacy of legislative appointments. Although this article ex-
presses no opinion about the lessons to be drawn from the Rhode
Island experience, it concludes by noting that experience elsewhere
indicates that there may be more effective means of responding to
the administrative state that do not pose a corresponding threat to
the values underlying separation of powers.
I. FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS OF STATE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
the doctrine of separation of powers does not apply to the states. 7
The claim is plausible enough. The principle of separation of pow-
ers is nowhere expressly stated in the federal Constitution, but is
instead an inference from specific provisions such as the Incompat-
ibility Clause and the architecture of the Constitution itself. Arti-
cle One vests "All legislative Powers" listed in Congress;8 Article
Two vests "The executive Power" in the President;9 and Article
Three vests "the judicial Power" in the Supreme Court and
whatever lower federal courts Congress should choose to create. 10
This structure, especially when read in light of the Framers' high
regard for the concept of separation of powers," strongly suggests
6. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
7. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605,
615 (1974); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
9. Id. art. II, § 1.
10. Id. art. III, § 1.
11. See The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
19981
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a limit on the inter-branch mixing of functions, even beyond spe-
cific prohibitions like the Incompatibility Clause. Plainly, how-
ever, this limit applies to the federal government rather than the
states, for the first three articles of the federal Constitution set
forth the overall structure of the federal government rather than
the states. Furthermore, principles of federalism also imply that,
within broad limits, the states should be permitted to adopt gov-
ernmental structures that suit them.
Still, it is something of an overstatement to say that the prin-
ciple of separation of powers has no application to the states. Sev-
eral constitutional provisions indicate that the federal
Constitution implicitly assumes that state governments will be
structured along lines broadly similar to the federal government.
First, consider the amendment procedure of Article V. It pro-
vides for the calling of a Constitutional Convention "on the Appli-
cation of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States," and
requires ratification (of proposed amendments emerging from such
a convention or from Congress) by "the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be pro-
posed by the Congress."12 Both the provision for the calling of a
convention and the ratification procedure depend upon the exist-
ence of bodies called state "legislatures." If a state had no legisla-
ture independent of the state executive, it could not participate in
ratification (unless Congress took the unusual step of calling for
ratification by state Conventions). Although it would be somewhat
far-fetched to read Article Five as mandating separate state legis-
lative and executive bodies, the Article does evince an underlying
assumption that such separate bodies will exist.
Other federal constitutional provisions similarly assume the
existence of distinct branches of state government. State legisla-
tures may fix the times, places and manner of holding Congres-
sional elections. 13 Similarly, "the Electors in each State shall have
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); Gordon
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 446-53 (1969).
12. U.S. Const. art. V.
13. See id. art. I, § 4. Congress may override most of these decisions, however.
See id.
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Branch of the State Legislature." 14 Even more significantly, the
Seventeenth Amendment clearly distinguishes between a state
legislature and a state executive. It provides:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in
the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the leg-
islature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointment until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 15
The above examples illustrate that the federal Constitution
assumes that state governments will have distinct legislative and
executive branches. It also assumes a distinct state judicial
branch. Consider first the Madisonian Compromise embodied in
Article III, which creates a Supreme Court and leaves to Congress
the option of deciding whether to create lower federal courts. 16 By
vesting appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and leaving
open the possibility that there would be no lower federal courts,
Article III necessarily assumes that the appellate jurisdiction
could be exercised over judgments of state courts,'7 for it is in the
nature of the federal "judicial Power" that appellate courts review
judicial, as opposed to legislative or executive judgments.
Indeed, the Supremacy Clause treats state courts as distinct
from other organs of state government.' 8 After declaring the
supremacy of federal law, it states that "the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding."' 9 One should not make too
much of this language, because state executive and legislative offi-
cials are also obligated to respect the supremacy of federal law.
14. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
15. Id. amend. XVII, cl. 2. The predecessor provision to the quoted text in the
original Constitution also distinguished among the branches of state government.
It provided that "if [Senate] Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, dur-
ing the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make
temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall
then fill such Vacancies." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
16. See id. art. III, § 1.
17. The Supreme Court made just this point early in our nation's history. See
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816). Similarly, Herbert
Wechsler relied on the vesting of appellate jurisdiction in defending judicial review
in response to Judge Learned Hand. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
cipals of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1959).
18. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
19. Id.
1998]
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But neither should one make too little of the specific admonition to
state judges. As a couple of recent cases indicate, the Supremacy
Clause does suggest a distinct role for state courts as opposed to
state legislatures.
In Printz v. United States,20 the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress may not issue directives to state executive officials on the
ground that doing so violates a principle of federalism that prohib-
its Congress from "commandeering" them.21 Five years earlier, the
Court held in New York v. United States,22 that Congress may not
"commandeer" a state legislature by requiring it to enact a law. 23
Yet, in Testa v. Katt,24 the Court, invoking the Supremacy Clause,
had held that state courts must be open to the assertion of federal
rights on an equal footing with the assertion of state rights.25 In
attempting to distinguish Testa in both Printz and New York, the
Court asserted that it was not distinguishing between judicial obli-
gations on the one hand and executive or legislative obligations on
the other; in each case, the Court claimed that Testa merely re-
quires that all branches of state government recognize the
supremacy of federal law.26 However, the distinction seems uncon-
vincing, for in Testa, federal law imposes affirmative obligations on
state courts-where they are open to state claims they must open
their doors to the assertion of federal causes of action equally-just
as the provisions invalidated in Printz and New York imposed af-
firmative obligations on the state executive and legislative
branches, respectively.27 Reconciling Printz and New York with
Testa would seem to require an argument that state courts, as op-
posed to state executive and legislative bodies, have a distinctive
role in enforcing federal law. Such an argument would draw
strength from the text of the Supremacy Clause and from the gen-
eral proposition that the federal Constitution assumes that state
20. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
21. Id. at 2379-83.
22. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
23. Id. at 145.
24. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
25. See id. at 392-93.
26. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381; New York, 505 U.S. at 144, 178-79.
27. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Con-
gress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
1001, 1029-30 (1995).
THE RELEVANCE OF FEDERAL NORMS
governments will be structured along lines broadly similar to those
of the federal government.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the United States
Supreme Court has not been fully attentive to the degree to which
the federal Constitution assumes separation of powers in state
government. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's view
about the proper method by which federal courts should discern
the content of state law on questions as to which the state high
court has not spoken. Under these circumstances, a federal court
exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction (or required to de-
cide a state law issue as a preliminary step in resolving a federal
one), should attempt to predict how the state high court would rule
on the question. 28 Although I believe it misleading to call this pro-
cess "prediction,"29 I have no quarrel with the proposition that
under many circumstances it will be appropriate for a federal court
to derive principles of state law from emergent trends in the juris-
prudence of state high courts.3 0
However, the same cannot be true for state legislatures. Sup-
pose that a bill pending in the state legislature would change the
state's law on some question at issue in a case pending before a
federal court. If there is no way for the federal court to postpone
its decision, would it not be wholly illegitimate for the court to
"predict" that the bill will pass, and thus apply its provisions? The
very idea seems profoundly misguided, notwithstanding the fact
that the Supreme Court has often stated that as far as the federal
courts are concerned, state courts are just like state legislatures. 31
28. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651,
695 n.151 (1995) (collecting cases).
29. See id. at 661-89 (arguing that viewing law as simply "predictions" of how
courts will rule is inconsistent with the impersonal ideal of the rule of law); id. at
695-715 (applying this argument to diversity and similar cases).
30. Indeed, I would go further than the United States Supreme Court-which
has stated that in matters of federal law, state courts and lower federal courts
should wait for the Supreme Court to deliver the coup de grace to Supreme Court
cases that have been undermined but not formally overruled. See id. at 676-77
n.87 (discussing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989)); see also Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) (acknowl-
edging that the lower federal courts must leave to the Supreme Court "the peroga-
tive of overriding its own decision" (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484)).
31. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (equating the "au-
thority" of state courts with the authority of state legislatures); see also Dorf, supra
note 28, at 707-08 (discussing the conception ' of legal positivism that underlies the
Supreme Court's equating state courts with state legislatures).
1998]
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Were they to give the matter serious consideration, the federal
courts would undoubtedly reject the possibility of anticipating leg-
islative changes in state law, while they might well adhere to the
practice of anticipating judicial changes-and properly so. Under
deeply rooted principles of American jurisprudence, courts make
law in a different manner from the way in which legislatures do. If
a line of doctrine has seriously undermined the rationale for some
old rule of the common law, lawyers and lower court judges may
justifiably look to the inapplicability of the old reasons to say that
the old rule is no longer good law. By contrast, with a few excep-
tions, legal actors would characterize legislation based on outdated
premises as in need of reform, but they would not say that the leg-
islation is no longer binding-even if new legislation is just around
the corner.32 In other words, some distinction between state courts
and state legislatures is a deep principle of federal law.33
This Part has argued that the federal Constitution and vari-
ous doctrines interpreting it assume that state governments will
have distinct legislative, executive and judicial branches.
Although there is no express principle mandating separation of
powers in state government, some such principle can nonetheless
be inferred from the Constitution's structure. The idea of inferring
constitutional principles from underlying assumptions is a familiar
interpretive move. 34 The foregoing does not, of course, demon-
32. For the most prominent exceptions, see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738-43
(2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Guido Cala-
bresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982); William J. Stuntz, The Un-
easy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J.
1, 67-69 (1997) (urging a constitutional doctrine of desuetude for the criminal law).
See also Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d
720, 724-26 (W. Va. 1992) (applying a doctrine of statutory desuetude rooted in the
due process requirement of fair notice).
33. But cf Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Pos-
itivism and Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459, 1514-17 (1997)
(arguing that federal court predictions of state judicial action stand on an equal
footing with federal court predictions of state legislative action).
34. For example, the Court infers a broad principle of state sovereign immu-
nity from the Constitution's background assumptions, notwithstanding the limited
text of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54, 72-73 (1996). Similarly, in recognizing unenumerated rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses, the Court interpolates
and extrapolates from the "rational continuum" marked out by the specific provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting on jurisdictional grounds); see also Charles Black, Structure and Rela-
tionship in Constitutional Law (1969) (arguing that the Supreme Court often in-
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strate that the federal doctrine of separation of powers applies to
the states in all of its particulars; surely it does not. But the fore-
going does show that the assertion that some specific separation-
of-powers principle applies to the states cannot simply be dis-
missed without serious analysis.
II. JUSTICIABILITY OF THE GUARANTY CLAUSE IN STATE COURT
The most plausible textual home for a federal constitutional
requirement of state separation of powers appears to be the Guar-
anty Clause.35 It provides: "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of
the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence."36 Note that this provi-
sion is itself further evidence of the Constitution's tacit assumption
that state governments must have distinct legislative and execu-
tive branches. However, Supreme Court doctrine is quite clear
that challenges brought under the Guaranty Clause are not justici-
able because they present political questions.37
Much recent scholarship criticizes the Supreme Court's con-
clusion that the Guaranty Clause is not justiciableY.s Moreover,
the Court has indicated a potential willingness to re-examine that
fers doctrine from the relations among the institutions established by the
Constitution's structure); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the
Constitution 76-79 (1991) (applauding the approach of Justice Harlan's Poe
dissent).
35. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-85 (1992); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Pacific States Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912).
38. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 849 (1994) (arguing for justiciability); Julian N.
Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of
Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 733 (1994) (same); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role For the Guarantee
Clause, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 815 (1994) (same). But see Ann Althouse, Time For The
Federal Courts to Enforce the Guarantee Clause?-A Response to Professor
Chemerinsky, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 881 (1994) (arguing against justiciability); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749 (1994)
(same); Jesse H. Choper, Observations on the Guarantee Clause-As Thoughtfully
Addressed by Justice Linde and Professor Eule, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 741 (1994)
(same).
1998]
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conclusion. 39 Whatever the eventual outcome of that debate, for
now it is clear that the Guaranty Clause is not justiciable in fed-
eral court. However, it does not follow from that conclusion that
the Clause is not justiciable in state court. This Part argues that
the question whether the Guaranty Clause is justiciable in state
court is an open and difficult one.
As an initial matter, the justiciability limits applicable in fed-
eral court do not invariably apply in state court. For example, the
prohibition on the issuance of advisory opinions by federal courts is
an interpretation of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement,
which applies to the "judicial Power of the United States."40 Be-
cause state courts do not exercise that power-even when deciding
federal questions-the federal Constitution's prohibition on advi-
sory opinions does not apply in state court, as the pending Rhode
Island case itself clearly illustrates. Similarly, other justiciability
doctrines rooted in the case-or-controversy requirement-such as
standing, ripeness and mootness-do not apply in state court,
although of course states may have parallel doctrines as a matter
of state constitutional, statutory, or judge-made law.41
What is the textual source of the prohibition on the decision of
political questions? One need not fully agree with my colleague
Louis Henkin that there is no political question doctrine,42 to rec-
ognize that the doctrine, if it does exist, has multiple sources. De-
pending on the nature of the case and issue, the conclusion that a
question is political will be based on some combination of concerns
rooted in Article III, the specific substantive provision of the Con-
stitution invoked, separation of powers, federalism and prudential
considerations.
Some matters presenting non-justiciable political questions in
federal court will also present non-justiciable political questions in
39. See New York, 505 U.S. at 184-85; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582
(1964).
40. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
41. See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d
731, 754 (Cal. 1998) (applying statutory standing requirements); Essex County v.
Zagata, 695 N.E.2d 232, 234-37 (N.Y. 1998) (determining ripeness of review of
agency action); State ex rel. Town of Middletown v. Anthony, 713 A.2d 207, 211
(R.I. 1998) (discussing mootness).
42. See generally Louis Henkin, Is there a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85
Yale L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing that no general-purpose doctrine exists requiring
courts to abstain from reviewing political questions).
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state court. As to these questions, the Constitution assigns exclu-
sive authority to the national political branches; the assignment
thus excludes state as well as federal courts from an interpretive
role. For example, suppose that some case otherwise properly
before a court turns on the resolution of a question at the heart of
the foreign affairs power, such as which of two groups is the legiti-
mate government of a foreign nation. A federal court would, in def-
erence to the national political branches, typically defer to their
resolution of that question, rather than undertake its own analy-
sis.4 3 It follows a fortiori that a state court would likewise be obli-
gated to defer to the decision of the national political branches, for
the state court shares with the federal court the limitations that
flow from its status as a court, and in addition, is a state body,
thereby disempowered to conduct foreign policy.
However, if a case presents a political question in federal court
because of concerns rooted primarily in Article III or federalism (or
both), then it may well be appropriate for resolution in state court.
At least for some purposes, the conclusion that the Guaranty
Clause is not justiciable appears to fall into that category. Were a
federal court to declare that the structure of state government did
not constitute a Republican Form of Government, it would intrude
deeply into the state's internal affairs and potentially commit the
national political organs to taking sides in a dangerous conflict. As
far as the Guaranty Clause is concerned, that may be the primary
lesson to be drawn from the Dorr Rebellion, which casts such a
long shadow over the present controversy. 44 Yet such federalism
concerns are absent when the edict comes from a state court. To
be sure, there may be prudential reasons for a state court to stay
its hand, especially if bloody conflict may result. That does not ap-
pear to be a federal limit, however, and thankfully, the present
Rhode Island litigation poses no such risk.
Still, there is a textual difficulty with finding that the Guar-
anty Clause is justiciable in state but not federal court. The
Clause states that the United States is the guarantor of a "Republi-
can Form of Government."45 There is at least some irony in con-
43. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
44. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Wall.) 1, 42-43 (1849).
45. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
1998]
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cluding that a federal organ may not enforce the Clause but a state
one may.
4 6
The irony may be preferable to the alternative. Suppose some
rogue governor were to cancel elections and declare himself the
monarch of a state. Certainly, Congress and the President would
be obliged to declare the monarchy unconstitutional and restore
representative government, but is that the end of the matter?
Even before the national political branches act, would we not want
to say that the self-proclaimed monarch and his supporters have
violated the Constitution? In other words, the textual reference to
the United States should not be read to exclude a duty on state
officials themselves to maintain a republican form of government,
and indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized such a duty.47
Whether that duty extends to state judges or only to state political
actors may be a difficult question,48 but the textual reference to the
United States does not bear on that question.
Moreover, even if we thought the Guaranty Clause applied ex-
clusively to the (political branches of the) federal government, re-
call that Part I found support for the application of separation-of-
powers norms to state government throughout the Constitution.
Thus, we might conclude that the Guaranty Clause by itself does
not provide justiciable separation-of-powers norms, but that such
norms derive from the Guaranty Clause in combination with tacit
postulates of the Constitution's overall structure.
On the other hand, the precedents holding the Guaranty
Clause non-justiciable in federal court might be thought relevant
to an assessment of the justiciability of state separation-of-powers
claims rooted in other provisions, insofar as reliance on these other
provisions appears to circumvent the most directly relevant provi-
sion. And indeed, it is principally for that reason that this Part
46. See Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government:
Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 208, 208 (1987) (labeling "anoma-
lous" the possibility "that a duty entrusted to 'the United States' is exercised in
large part by state courts"); Walter F. Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions
of Constitutions, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54, 86 (1931) (claiming that non-justiciability of
the Guaranty Clause in state court follows a fortiori from non-justiciability in fed-
eral court).
47. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874) (stating that
"[tihe guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to
provide.., a [republican form of! government").
48. See Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 887, 943 n.202 (1994).
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has addressed the question whether the Guaranty Clause is justi-
ciable in state court. However, whatever the answer to that ques-
tion, the Clause's reference to the United States would not appear
to add very much. Were the Guaranty Clause the only textual ba-
sis for an argument that the federal Constitution imposes some
separation-of-powers requirement on the states, it is conceivable
that its reference to the "United States" could be seen as a "textual
commitment" to federal as opposed to state organs. 49 But given
the wealth of other sources, the language hardly seems dispositive.
The precedents holding the Guaranty Clause non-justiciable
in federal court would thus appear to have little to say about the
question whether the Clause is justiciable in state court. Never-
theless, in State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer,50 the Oregon
Supreme Court interpreted existing Supreme Court precedent as
rendering Guaranty Clause claims non-justiciable in state as well
as federal court.5 ' Some of the arguments given by the Sawyer
Court were repeated during the live portion of this symposium by
Jay Goodman, who has also filed an amicus curiae brief with the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.5 2 Therefore, I will consider in turn
the three reasons the Oregon Supreme Court gave for its
conclusion.
First, the court observed that the leading United States
Supreme Court case, Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon,53 holds that
enforcement of the Guaranty Clause is exclusively committed to
Congress, without distinguishing between state and federal
courts.54 It is true that the language of Pacific Telephone Co. is
broad, and read out of context, could be thought to apply to the
power of state as well as federal courts. However, the better read-
ing acknowledges that the Supreme Court was speaking of its own
power as one of the "courts of the United States."55 Throughout
49. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (holding that a tex-
tual commitment to another branch is a basis for finding that an issue presents a
non-justiciable political question (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
50. 932 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1997).
51. See id. at 1157-62.
52. See Brief of Jay Goodman in Support of the Legislature's Right to Appoint
at 5-8, In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-
M.P.).
53. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
54. See Sawyer, 932 P.2d at 1159-60 (citing Pacific Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 137,
151).
55. Pacific Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 142, 151.
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the Pacific Telephone Co. opinion, the Supreme Court inquired into
the limits of the "judicial power."56 Decided in an era when the
lines between federal and state judicial authority were less clear
than they are today,57 it is conceivable that the Court was speak-
ing about courts generally, but to make sense of this language to-
day, we do better to read the "judicial power" as a reference to the
power exercised by federal courts in virtue of Article III.
Similarly, the Pacific Telephone Co. Court's statement that
Guaranty Clause claims are "solely committed by the Constitution
to the judgment of Congress,"58 must be read in the context of a
struggle between Congress and a federal rather than a state court.
Consider, by way of analogy, the state of the law after Powell v.
McCormack,59 in which the Court ruled that the Qualifications
Clause 60 sets forth the exclusive qualifications for members of Con-
gress, so that Congress could not exclude from its membership a
representative who, it was conceded, had the requisite qualifica-
tions.6 1 The Powell Court understood its decision as resting on the
"Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of
Congress had been fixed in the Constitution."62 Nevertheless, in
Thornton v. U.S. Term Limits Inc.,63 four dissenting justices
thought Powell silent on the question whether a state, as opposed
to Congress, may impose additional qualifications on members of
Congress. 64 Moreover, although the majority in Term Limits
claimed that Powell was controlling by its terms,65 the majority set
forth a lengthy argument that the historical and policy grounds for
Powell's rule applied in cases involving state-imposed as well as
Congressionally imposed qualifications, 66 thereby confirming the
dissent's view that a rule of constitutional law announced in a case
56. Id. at 141, 148, 150.
57. Under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts decided
most questions of state common law on their own, without deferring to state court
authority. See id. at 18-19. Swift was not overruled until 1938. See Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
58. Pacific Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 133.
59. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
60. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
61. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 550.
62. Id. at 540.
63. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
64. See id. at 847-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 796 & n.12.
66. See id. at 788-98, 816-22, 827.
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involving a limit on federal power does not automatically apply to
state power. Similarly, there may be reasons to conclude that
Guaranty Clause claims are not justiciable in state court, but that
conclusion does not follow automatically from the fact that they are
not justiciable in federal court.
The Oregon Supreme Court also believed that two United
States Supreme Court decisions-Cochran v. Louisiana State
Board of Education,67 and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing-
ton,6 8 -expressly held that Guaranty Clause claims are non-justi-
ciable in state court. 69 In fact, the cases held no such thing. In
both cases, the state high court had rejected a Guaranty Clause
challenge, which was renewed in the United States Supreme
Court.70 The Court necessarily held that the challenges were not
justiciable in the United States Supreme Court.71 It did not rule on
the question whether the federal Constitution precludes a state
court finding of justiciability. To be sure, in Mountain Timber Co.,
the Supreme Court of Washington had itself relied on cases hold-
ing Guaranty Clause claims non-justiciable in federal court for the
conclusion that they are not justiciable in state court,7 2 but in af-
firming the judgment, the United State Supreme Court did not de-
cide whether that conclusion was proper. The United States
Supreme Court has never decided whether the Guaranty Clause is
justiciable in state court, and while a substantial number of state
high courts have said it is not, 73 most of them simply assume with-
out analysis that the precedents involving federal courts apply to
cases brought in state court.7 4
67. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
68. 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
69. See State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1160 (Or. 1997).
70. See Cochran, 281 U.S. at 373-74; Mountain Timber, 243 U.S. at 228, 237.
71. See Cochran, 281 U.S. at 374; Mountain Timber, 243 U.S. at 234, 246.
72. See State v. Mountain Timber Co., 135 P. 645, 649 (Wash. 1913).
73. See, e.g., Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d
656, 663-64 (Md. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Baum v. New-
bry, 267 P.2d 220, 224 (Or. 1954). But see, e.g., In re Interrogatories, 536 P.2d 308
(Colo. 1975) (treating the Guaranty Clause as justiciable in state court, although
rejecting the claim on the merits); Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan.
1973) (same).
74. See generally Edward A. Stelzer, Note, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State
Court Enforcement of the Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870 (1993) (presum-
ing that federal court precedents pertain to adjudication in state courts).
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The third reason given by the Oregon Supreme Court for its
conclusion that Guaranty Clause claims are not justiciable is a
concern that if state courts can resolve such claims while federal
courts cannot, the Supreme Court will be unable to ensure the uni-
formity of federal law. 75 If different state courts interpret the
Guaranty Clause differently, the Court will be unable to resolve
the conflict.7 6 This is a legitimate concern, but if taken seriously it
would mean that every issue that presents a political question in
federal court would, ipso facto, present a political question in state
court. Yet that result seems perverse at least in those instances
where federalism concerns underlie the determination that an is-
sue presents a political question in federal court.
Thus, the concern about uniformity has not led the Supreme
Court to apply all of its justiciability doctrines to the state courts.
If the Rhode Island Supreme Court issues an advisory opinion on a
question of federal law that conflicts with an advisory opinion of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on the same question,
the United States Supreme Court cannot resolve the conflict; yet
that fact does not render the federal prohibition on advisory opin-
ions applicable in state court.
Political questions may, however, present a more serious uni-
formity problem than other justiciability doctrines. If a state court
issues an advisory opinion or decides a case in which a party would
lack standing were the case in federal court, the United States
Supreme Court may not be able to review the decision, but eventu-
ally, if the issue is sufficiently important, it will arise in a context
that presents a justiciable case or controversy. Indeed, in some
cases in which the plaintiff originally lacks standing, the very deci-
sion of the state court-if accompanied by an order of suitable re-
lief-will create standing for purposes of appeal. 77 By contrast, a
political question may be thought to be inherently non-justiciable,
75., See State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1160-61 (Or. 1997).
76. See id.
77. See Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1989):
When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in
the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing
the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the
judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to
the parties who petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or
controversy are also met.
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so that a conflict among state courts would never be resolvable by
the United States Supreme Court.
The Oregon Supreme Court is therefore right to be concerned
about the uniformity of federal law. But it does not follow that
holding Guaranty Clause claims non-justiciable in state court fur-
thers uniformity. Recall that absent Congressional or state judi-
cial resolution of Guaranty Clause claims, such issues will be
decided in the first instance by the political branches of the states.
State courts typically look to the decisions of their sister states in
resolving common questions; state legislatures and executive
branch officials may be less inclined to do so, principally because
they do not typically provide reasons for their decisions in the way
that courts do. Relegating Guaranty Clause issues to state legisla-
tures and state executives to the exclusion of state courts will thus
result in very little inter-state harmonization. In short, allowing
state courts to adjudicate Guaranty Clause claims may lead to a
more visible lack of uniformity than would be apparent if such
claims were deemed non-justiciable in state court, but state court
adjudication would nonetheless likely increase the actual uniform-
ity of federal law. Indeed, the visibility of disuniformity might
spur Congress or the President to take action.
Thus, existing doctrine leaves open the question whether
Guaranty Clause claims are justiciable in state court. This Part
has offered some reasons to conclude that they ought to be.
Whether and when those claims ought to prevail, however, is a
separate question. For even if Guaranty Clause or related claims
are justiciable in state court, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court
appears to believe, 78 a wide range of arrangements will probably
satisfy the Clause. Similarly, even if the federal Constitution im-
poses some requirement of separation of powers on the states, that
requirement too will likely be satisfied by a variety of systems.
The next Part turns to these questions directly.
III. THE INCORPORATION ANALOGY
Thus far this Article has addressed the general question of
whether the federal Constitution imposes any judicially enforcea-
ble obligations on the shape of state government. It has tenta-
78. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n), 612 A.2d 1,
16-17 (R.I. 1992).
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tively suggested an affirmative answer. For example, if a state
were to abolish its legislative and judicial branches, and consoli-
date all power in an executive-even an elected one-neither the
Constitution's text nor the precedents of the United States
Supreme Court should be read to preclude a state court's invalida-
tion of that scheme.
Fortunately, reality does not present such stark violations of
the republican principle. More typically, principles of republican
government and separation of powers are invoked to question the
validity of such supplemental institutions as popular referenda 79
or independent administrative agencies.80 Similarly, in the pend-
ing Rhode Island litigation, the issue concerns a second-order prin-
ciple: in a state which clearly has distinct legislative, executive
and judicial branches, to what extent may legislators serve on or
appoint members to commissions within the executive branch?
If that question concerned the federal government, the answer
would be clear: not at all. The express text of the Incompatibility
Clause forbids any "Person holding any Office under the United
States [from being] a Member of either House during his Continu-
ance in Office," 8 ' and the United States Supreme Court has relied
on this provision to invalidate service on executive boards by indi-
vidual members of Congress.8 2 In addition, the express text of the
Appointments Clause prescribes that the Senate may confirm
79. See, e.g., William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative
Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democ-
racy, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 583, 608-10 (1994); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmak-
ing is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or.
L. Rev. 19 (1993); Marc Slonim & James H. Lowe, Comment, Judicial Review of
Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 175, 192-94 (1979). But see, e.g.,
Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 Iowa
L. Rev. 637, 644 (1980).
80. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1936)
(rejecting claim that agency's exercise of delegated authority is inconsistent with
republican government); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Con-
stitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 477, 504; James C.
Thomas, Fifty Years with the Administrative Procedure Act and Judicial Review
Remains an Enigma, 32 Tulsa L.J. 259, 270-71 (1996). Note that the Guaranty
Clause has also been invoked as a limitation on the federal government's power to
interfere with state autonomy, thereby turning the usual arguments on their head.
See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federal-
ism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1988).
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6 cl. 2.
82. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
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Presidential nominees;8 3 the Supreme Court has held that this
procedure is the exclusive means by which Congress may partici-
pate in the selection of executive officers.8 4
However, by their terms, both the Incompatibility Clause and
the Appointments Clause apply to the United States, and not the
states.8 5 Although both clauses no doubt implement the Framers'
general conception of separation of powers, it seems implausible
that either provision is essential to the very notion of separation of
powers. Recall from Part I that some principle of separation of
powers in state government appears to be a tacit postulate of the
federal Constitution. But the provisions from which we inferred
this tacit postulate do no more than identify the existence of dis-
tinct legislative, executive and judicial branches of state govern-
ment. They do not appear to mandate strict separation of those
branches.
Indeed, it would be very odd to say that the federal Constitu-
tion mandates strict separation of powers for state government
when it does no such thing for the federal government. In part to
facilitate inter-branch cooperation, and in part to enable each
branch to check the others, the Constitution gives the President
the quasi-legislative power to sign or veto bills8 6 and allows Con-
gress and the courts to play a role in the quasi-executive function
of appointments.8 7 Given that the federal Constitution does not
command strict separation of powers even for the federal govern-
ment, there is no reason to think that the strictest of its provisions
specifically applicable to the federal government must also apply to
the states. In short, the right answer to the question of how much
separation of powers the Constitution requires of the states is:
some, but certainly not everything required of the federal
government.
The difficult task will be to discern what specific practices are
so extreme as to warrant the conclusion that a state lacks a dis-
tinct legislative, executive and judicial branch. Suppose that a
state were to adopt a parliamentary model in which the chief exec-
83. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
84. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976).
85. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6; id. art. II, cl. 2.
86. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
87. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673, 676 (1988); see also U.S. Const.
art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 ("[Blut the Congress may by Law vest the Appoinment of such
inferior Officers,... in the President alone, in the Courts of Law . .. ").
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utive is also the leader of the majority party (or coalition) in parlia-
ment and her cabinet members are all also members of parliament.
If such a system satisfies the Constitution's implicit requirement
that states have identifiable legislative, executive and judicial
branches, then, a fortiori, so does Rhode Island's practice of legisla-
tive appointments.
In thinking about this sort of issue, it may be useful to recall
the experience of the United States Supreme Court during the pe-
riod when it was deciding what individual rights applicable to the
federal government are also applicable to the states by virtue of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing
for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut,"8 Justice Cardozo stated that
the Due Process Clause includes those principles of justice that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 The Palko test ap-
peared to focus on the question whether a fair legal system could
be imagined that did not include the limitation in question; for
that reason, in applying the test, the Court rarely invalidated state
laws or practices. 90 The Court eventually rejected the Palko for-
mulation, however, and found that most of the protections set forth
in the Bill of Rights are "incorporated" against the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 91 Under the newer approach, articulated
most plainly in Duncan v. Louisiana,92 the Court extended protec-
tion even to rights that were "not necessarily fundamental to fair-
ness in every [legal] system that might be imagined but [were
thought to be] fundamental in the context of the [legal] processes
maintained by the American States."93
Following an approach based on Palko, we might say that be-
cause we can imagine a parliamentary system that is consistent
with republican government and disperses power sufficiently to
prevent tyranny, Rhode Island's use of legislative appointments is
an easy case. On the other hand, under an approach based on
Duncan, a parliamentary system would be unconstitutional as in-
consistent with an essentially unbroken tradition in American
88. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
89. Id. at 325.
90. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
91. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 773 (2d ed. 1988).
92. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
93. Id. at 150 n.14. Note, however, that in cases involving unenumerated
rights under the Due Process Clause, the Court still sometimes invokes the Palko
formula. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997).
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state and national government dating to the Founding. Although
legislative appointments of the kind practiced in Rhode Island do
not diverge from the American pattern so clearly as does a full par-
liamentary system, they are nonetheless quite out of step with the
general practice in the United States, and thus a Duncan approach
might well invalidate Rhode Island's practice.
Nonetheless, the Palko approach may be more appropriate in
the separation-of-powers context than the Duncan approach, be-
cause questions about the applicability of separation-of-powers
norms to the states arise in a different context from questions
about the applicability of the Bill of Rights. Considerable disagree-
ment exists as to whether the Reconstruction Congress intended
the Fourteenth Amendment (through the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause) to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. 94
But whatever the answer to that question, there can be little doubt
that the impulse behind incorporation-limiting the power of
states to infringe individual rights-responds to the principal,
transformative concern of the Fourteenth Amendment. By con-
trast, no historical transformation occurred that would warrant
applying the doctrine of separation of powers to the states more
strictly now than in earlier times.
Quite the contrary, the one shift (or "constitutional mo-
ment"95) that bears on the present inquiry is the growth of the ad-
ministrative state in the twentieth century. To make sense of that
shift-discussed at greater length in Part IV-requires that sepa-
ration-of-powers concepts like the non-delegation doctrine be ap-
plied loosely rather than strictly. An era like our own, in which
power is moving from federal to state bureaucracies, seems a par-
ticularly poor time to apply rigid doctrines rooted in eighteenth
century conceptions of how government operates.
Thus, while the federal Constitution may well impose justicia-
ble limits on the structure of state government, the federal doc-
94. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-74 (1947) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (arguing in favor of incorporation) and Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992) (same) with
Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 91-92 (1989) (ar-
guing against incorporation) and Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 90 (1949) (same).
95. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations, passim (1990); 2 Bruce
Ackerman, We The People: Transformations 409 (1998).
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trines applying the Incompatibility Clause and the Appointments
Clause probably are not among those limits.
In any event, even if this conclusion is wrong, it would be fool-
hardy for the Rhode Island Supreme Court (or any state court fac-
ing a comparable question) to invalidate legislative appointments
on the basis of the federal Constitution rather than the state con-
stitution. For if the court were to base its ruling on federal law
exclusively, then in a non-advisory case, the United States
Supreme Court could overrule the decision. By contrast, if the
court makes clear that its decision is based on the state constitu-
tion, then regardless of whether the court believes that the federal
Constitution provides an alternative basis for the same holding,
there would be no grounds for the United States Supreme Court to
review the decision.96
IV. FACING THE NORMATWVE QUESTION: INCOMPATIBILITY,
AGENCIES, AND DEMOCRACY
Other contributors to this symposium have offered insightful
analyses of the merits of the state constitutional claim. Without
directly entering that debate, this Part offers some reflections on
the lessons that may be drawn by comparing and contrasting the
state and federal experiences for purposes of informing an evalua-
tion of the state constitutional claim.
First, the text of the Rhode Island Constitution contains an
express separation-of-powers (or to be more precise, distribution of
powers) principle. It states: "The powers of the government shall
be distributed into three departments: the legislative, executive
and judicial."9 7 By contrast, the federal principle of separation of
powers must be inferred from the Constitution's structure. On the
other hand, even if the federal Constitution's overall commitment
to separation of powers is more ambivalent than the Rhode Island
Constitution's, the federal Constitution is expressly committed to
the particular prohibition of legislative appointments to executive
bodies. Thus, in general, textual arguments will support a more
robust protection for separation of powers in Rhode Island than at
the federal level, but in the particular case under consideration,
the opposite is true.
96. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1032-33 (1983).
97. R.I. Const. art. V.
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Second, although Palko rather than Duncan supplies the ap-
propriate test for determining whether a particular structural as-
pect of federal constitutional law applies of its own force to the
states, when a state court looks to federal law as persuasive au-
thority for the interpretation of the state constitution, Duncan's fo-
cus on American systems of government makes more sense than
Palko's consideration of hypothetical or foreign legal systems. The
history of the Rhode Island Constitution is, after all, part of the
history of the United States. Rhode Island's conception of separa-
tion of powers was born and developed in a context that was influ-
enced by the national experience and the experience of its sister
states to a much greater extent than by experience in other nations
with quite different government structures. To recognize these
commonalities is not (necessarily) to endorse universalism in state
constitutional interpretation. 98 Different states would still be enti-
tled to interpret their constitutions differently, even when they
contain identical language. The point is simply that in exercising
its independent judgment as to the meaning of a state constitution,
a state high court need not and should not ignore the most relevant
experience of other states.
Third and perhaps most important, any interpretation of the
principle of separation of powers in federal or state government
must confront the reality of the administrative state. The high
school civics picture of a legislature that makes the law, an execu-
tive that enforces the law and a judiciary that interprets the law is
not only confounded by constitutionally sanctioned instances of
power-sharing by the formal branches-such as the role of Presi-
dents and Governors in signing or vetoing legislation-but by ad-
ministrative agencies that combine law-making, law-enforcing and
law-interpreting functions. If we are prepared to accept such enti-
ties, why should we worry about such relatively small affronts to
separation of powers as legislative appointments to executive
commissions?
Commentary on the federal case law conventionally divides
cases facing such questions into "formalist" and "functionalist" ap-
proaches. 99 Cases falling into the formalist category tend to invali-
98. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn't: Constitu-
tional Universalism in the States, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 109 (1998).
99. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers and The Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984).
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date efforts by one branch of government to exercise a power
formally assigned to another, 00 while functionalist decisions tend
to permit novel arrangements.' 10 In the interest of full disclosure,
I should say that, at least absent the clear violation of an express
constitutional provision, I find little to recommend formalism. It is
simply insufficient to say "that is not how we have done things
here," when the same could be, and has been, said more forcefully
with respect to the agencies.
However, I am not a fan of functionalism either, to the extent
that functionalism has become synonymous with the application of
a deferential or conclusory balancing test.10 2 To my mind, func-
tionalism properly conceived asks whether a particular practice
has the actual effect of distorting the balance of power between the
branches, taking into account the reality of administrative agen-
cies and other conditions of the modern age. Justice White's dis-
senting opinion in INS v. Chadha0 3 is a good example of this
method. In that case, Justice White would have upheld a unicam-
eral legislative veto on the ground that it simply restored the sta-
tus quo that existed before Congress delegated its authority to
withhold deportation to the Attorney General. 10 4 Although one
can quarrel with Justice White's characterization of the legislative
veto as merely restoring the status quo ante rather than working a
net increase in Congressional power, if one were to agree with the
characterization, I do not think it would be a sufficient defense of
the majority's holding to say that Congress could choose simply not
to delegate authority.
Administrative agencies exist because we cannot live without
them. To be sure, sometimes Congress or a state legislature dele-
gates authority to an agency because it wants to take credit for
"solving" some large social problem without having to make the
unpopular choices required to implement real solutions on the
100. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
101. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. O1-
son, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
102. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (phrasing the separation-of-powers inquiry
as whether the limits on the removal power are "of such a nature that they impede
the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty").
103. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
104. See id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
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ground.' 0 5 But there are also legitimate grounds for delegating
power to agencies. Chiefly, neither a state legislature nor Con-
gress has the time or expertise to take all the steps necessary to
formulate policy in a complicated and rapidly changing world.
Despite their necessity, administrative agencies can pose two
principal kinds of structural constitutional problems. First, when
the executive branch closely supervises the agency, there is a risk
of concentration of power in the executive branch, upsetting the
balance of power. Partly to avoid this risk, and partly to replace
politics with expertise in administrative agencies, legislatures
sometimes create independent (or quasi-independent) agencies not
directly answerable to the executive branch.' 0 6 But in thus solving
the balance-of-powers problem, legislatures create the second kind
of problem: agencies that are not accountable to the public. 10 7
We might therefore want to think of legislative participation
in the appointment and removal of executive agency officials as an
attempt to solve the first problem without creating the second.
The resulting body is accountable because it is answerable to
elected officials and does not risk upsetting the balance of powers
because those officials have ties to both political branches. On this
functionalist account, legislative appointments look like the best of
all possible worlds.
Whether the practice of legislative appointments in Rhode Is-
land in fact solves one of the characteristic problems of our age is,
however, a different question. Before concluding, I would offer
three reasons to be cautious before embracing legislative appoint-
ments as a panacea.
First, one should be careful to distinguish between, on the one
hand, individual legislators serving on executive commissions and,
on the other, non-legislators appointed by and answerable to the
whole legislature serving on such commissions. Delegations by the
legislature to its subsets may pose greater problems than delega-
tions to third parties, even if the third parties serve at the pleasure
105. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice
to Improve Public Law 135-40 (1997); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted A
War Powers Act That Worked, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1379, 1380 (1988).
106. See generally James Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) (treating
the quasi-independence of agencies as their principal virtue).
107. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 421 (1987) (arguing that New Deal institutions too readily dispensed
with checks and balances).
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of the legislature. The reason is that in the former case, accounta-
bility does not run to the proper democratic body-the legislature
as a whole-but to individuals who serve distinct constituen-
cies.108 Perversely, service on executive agencies by actual legisla-
tors may render those agencies less accountable than they
otherwise would be-a conclusion that finds some support in the
fact that the Rhode Island agencies that do not include legislators
are subject to greater oversight than those that do.' 0 9
Second, much depends on experience. Legislative appoint-
ments to executive committees do not inherently lead to corrup-
tion, nor do they inevitably undermine the ability of the executive
to carry out its functions. However, if, over a long period of time,
experience with legislative appointments in some state leads to
corruption or ossification-and I have insufficient knowledge to
reach a judgment on that question in Rhode Island-then the pos-
sibility that legislative appointments might, in principle, be a good
idea, should yield to a judgment based on the facts as they are.
Third, legislative appointments may not be the best means of
democratizing the agencies. The raison d'6tre of administrative
agencies is to respond to deficiencies in the traditional three
branches of government. Stocking the agencies with traditional
executive or legislative officials responds to an accountability gap
by assimilating the agencies to the very institutions whose defi-
ciencies they are meant to correct.
As Charles Sabel and I have recently argued at some length, a
centralized mini-legislature or mini-executive or a combination of
the two will encounter many of the same difficulties of developing
solutions to rapidly changing complex regulatory problems that be-
devil the traditional legislature and executive. 10 Consequently, to
render administration more effective (and more democratically ac-
countable) requires that agencies be able to act on information not
available to the traditional organs of centralized government. And
108. Cf John F. Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 673 (1997) (justifying textualists' refusal to consult legislative history on
the ground that to do so would permit Congress to delegate its lawmaking power to
a sub-unit of itself).
109. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 50, In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
110. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 345-88 (1998).
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indeed, in areas such as community policing, 1 ' the provision of
social services to families 1 2 and environmental regulation,"13 na-
tional but especially state government entities have recently been
doing just that-by opening themselves up to direct democratic
participation. In these and other areas, successful democratization
of agency practice from the bottom up will make legislative infiltra-
tion of the agencies from the top increasingly indefensible.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the received wisdom, the federal Constitution
speaks to the issue of separation of powers in state government.
Yet it does so in a whisper, foreclosing only those arrangements
deeply offensive to principles of representative government. Un-
less we are prepared to say that parliamentary systems of govern-
ment in existence throughout the free world offend such principles,
Rhode Island's practice of legislative appointments to executive
commissions would appear to satisfy the federal Constitution's re-
quirements. The practice's validity under the state constitution
presents a more difficult question. Resolution of that question
should not turn on an abstract analysis of the supposedly inherent
features of the branches of government. Instead, where the rele-
vant text is ambiguous, the validity of legislative appointments
should be measured against the realistic alternatives, given the
complex regulatory problems presented by the modern world.
111. See id. at 327-32.
112. See id. at 324-27.
113. See id. at 373-88.
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